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Lombard Street in 1913
BANK OF ENGLAND
THE DOMINANT institution in Lombard Street in 1913 was, of course,
the Bank of England. Many writers have pointed to the curious nature
of England's Central Bank. A private corporation, organized in 1694
for purposes of war finance, it was subject to virtually no legal controls
except that a limit was imposed on its note circulation, and it was de-
barred from engaging in merchandising operations;' yet this private
corporation controlled the credit policy of the nation—one could almost
say of the world. It had a monopoly of the note issue in England and
Wales, and Bank of England notes comprised nearly two-thirds of the
note circulation of the entire United Kingdom. Notes of and deposits
with the Bank constituted the basic reserves of the joint stock banks
and the private banks. The discount houses, bill brokers, merchant
bankers, some insurance companies and stock brokers, and many foreign
banks kept deposits with the Bank of England.
Nominally, the operations of this powerful institution were con-
trolled by a Court, comprising a governor, a deputy governor, and 24
directors. The shareholders elected the directors, and the latter elected
the governor and deputy governor. In practice, new directors were
recommended by the Court itself and approved by the shareholders,
and the Court consulted the Treasury on matters of national policy.
Indeed, the Issue Department was a de facto government department;
its liabilities consisted solely of notes issued, and its assets of gold, funded
government debt, and other securities (Table 1). The fiduciary issue
against government debt was fixed by law;issuesagainst other
securities were permitted only as a consequence of the replacement of
the notes of other banks by the notes of the Bank under the Act of
1844. Otherwise, notes had to be backed one hundred percent by gold.2
The nature of the operations of the Banking Department is indicated
in Table 1. On the liabilities side, the "proprietors' capital" represented
the original capital of the Bank (£1.2 million) and additions per-
1SeeReport of the Committee on Finance and Industry (henceforth called the
"Macmillan Report") Cmd. 3897 (London, 1931) p. 25.
2 The Bank had the right to constitute a fourth of its metallic reserve in silver.
Since silver coins were not full legal tender, this provision was not effective.










Notes issued £52.32 £55.12 £93.71
S Assets
Government securities 11.02 11.02 11.02
Other securities 7.43 7.43 7.43








Proprietors' capital 14.55 14.55 14.55
Rest . 3.25 3.49 3.19
Public depositsb 10.26 12.71 30.43
Other deposits 61.09 54.42 143.75







Government securities 13.20 11.01 62.63
Other securities 52.14 47.31 100.99
Notes 22.72 25.42 27.72






a From The Economist., January 3, 1914, p. 33; August 1, 1914, p. 249; Novem-
ber 30, 1918, p. 753. In some cases totals do not agree with the sums of the
items because of rounding.
b Include Exchequer, Savings Banks, Commissioner of National Debt, and Divi-
dend Accounts.
mitted by subsequent legislation up to 1844. The "rest" wasreally
undistributed profits and reserves. "Public deposits" constituted the
accounts of the British government. "Other deposits," the largest
item on the liability side, consisted mainly of deposits of joint stock
and private banks, but also, in part, of deposits of merchant banks,
discount houses, foreign banks, Indian and colonial governments, and
a few large commercial and financial concerns. The "seven-day and
other bills," which were promises to pay on seven-days' notice, were
introduced in 1738, to provide a means of payment by mail safer than
notes, and to give the owners time to notify the Bank in case of a high-
way robbery of the mails.3 On the asset side, "government securities"
consisted of long- and intermediate-term obligations of the British
government, and British Treasury bills purchased for the Bank's own
The bills were originally for three days, but this proved to be insufficient time
for making notifications. Cf. W. M. Acres, The Bank of England from Within
(London, 1931) pp. 158-59, and Sir John Clapham, The Bank of England (New
York, 1945) Vol. I, p. 144.
4account. The "other securities" were commercial bills and Treasury
bills discounted for customers, advances to bill brokers and other cus-
tomers of the Bank, foreign and colonial government securities, and
commercial bills purchased for the Bank's own account. The "notes"
consisted of currency issued by the Issue Department but not yet in
circulation. The "gold and silver coinage" was in fact mostly silver.
The chief instrument of central bank control was the rediscount or
Bank rate. Short-term interest rates were, for the most part, directly
related to the Bank rate: the rate paid by commercial banks on their
deposits was usually 1V2 to 2 percent the Bank rate; the rate
paid by discount houses on their deposits was usually '/4 percent higher
than that paid by commercial banks; the rate on advances from the
clearing houses to the discount market was usually 1 percent under the
Bank rate; the rate on prime bills was accordingly slightly higher than
the clearing house rate on advances; the rate on ordinary commercial
loans was the Bank rate plus a variable amount. Thus a change in the
rediscount rate would alter the entire complex of short-term money
rates in the same direction. In addition, the Bank utilized "open
market policy" (purchase or sale of securities and bills) to increase
or decrease the basic reserves of the financial system. Moreover, the
British financiers had what R. J. Truptil has called "a remarkable
sense of discipline," and "hints" received from the Bank were "followed
by the market."4
Before World War I, England was the guardian of the gold standard,
and the Bank was the institution primarily concerned with its control.
An outflow of gold from the Bank in response to an unfavorable balance
of payments was the signal for a rise in the Bank rate, designed to
attract foreign funds, and perhaps also to reduce British export prices
through monetary contraction and so to reverse the gold flow. For
this reason, the "ratio" of the Bank of England—the ratio of gold
and silver coin and notes to deposits—was anxiously watched by the
British money market and the entire financial world.
JOINT STOCK BANKS
Next in importance among British financial institutions on the eve
of World War I were the joint stock banks. After the crisis of 1825
and the accompanying large-scale failures of "private banks" (banks
with no more than six partners, each carrying unlimited liability), the
commercial banking business of the United Kingdom was gradually
taken over by the large banking corporations, or joint stock banks. In
R. J. Truptil, British Banks and the London Money Market (London, 1936)
pp. 212-17. See also Macmillan Report, op. cit., pp. 32-33, 92-106, and 155.
51913, only a few private banks remained, and the dozen or so joint
stock banks that were members of the London Clearing House domi-
nated the field. These banks had no legal reserve requirements, but
in practice they retained reserves of currency and balances with the
Bank of England equivalent to 9 to 11 percent of their deposits.5 It is
generally presumed that the hidden assets of the larger banks were
nearly as great as their published capital and reserves.6
Money at call amounted to almost as much as cash reserves. The
investments of the joint banks were government securities, mostly
Treasury bonds of intermediate and short maturity, and constituted
some 10-15 percent of total assets. Bills discounted included both
Treasury and commercial bills,, with the latter predominating. The
chief asset, reflecting the character of the major business done by the
banks, consisted of advances or commercial loans, and amounted to
roughly half of total assets; they were made mainly to industrial and
commercial firms, for three to six months. Deposits were by far the
largest liability of the joint stock banks.7
DISCOUNT MARKET
Truptil attributed the "pleasing harmony in the 'City" and the
"absence of sudden jars in the delicate machinery of the monetary
markets" largely to "the unique institution of discount houses."8 The
discount market consisted of discount houses and bill' brokers special-
izing in the purchase of Treasury and commercial bills on their own
account, using their own capital and the deposits of clients to some
extent, but relying mainly on day-to-day loans from the joint stock
banks with the bills as security. About half the market's capital re-
sources was held by the three largest discount houses (Alexanders,
National, and Union), which were organized as public companies and
which published regularly complete balance sheets. In addition, there
were in 1913 four private limited companies, ten private companies
with unlimited liability, and a few "running brokers" who served as
intermediaries between commercial houses and banks wishing to invest
5 The published statements show a reserve ratio averaging close to the upper limit
of this range, but these statements involve a certain amount of "window dressing"
—that is, temporary withdrawal of cash from the money market for the day for
which the weekly statement is published. The banks publish statements on different
days of the week. Consequently, the actual average reserves of the clearing banks,
as a whole, differ from those shown in the published statements. See R. J. Truptil,
op.cit., pp. 93-94, and Macmillan Report, op.cit.,p.36, paragraph 79, and
pp. 156-57. See also "End of Window Dressing," Chapter VI below.
6 Truptil, op. cit., p. 86.
Selected balance sheet items for joint stock banks are given in Appendix Table B.
8 Truptil, op. cit., p. 192. See also Macmillan Report, op. cit., p. 161.
6in bills and willing to pay a small commission for the special knowledge
of the brokers as to the reliability of various firms whose names appeared
as acceptors and endorsers.
Loans and deposits were the main liabilities of the three principal
discount houses, and bills discounted were the main asset. Most of the
bills, however, were Treasury bills or prime commercial bills, readily
discountable at the Bank of England. Cash reserves and investments—
thelatter comprising high-grade securitiesof British and foreign
governments, of short or intermediate maturity—amounted to only a
small percentage of total assets.9
The discount market the London banker with an ever-
present outlet for surplus liquid funds, permitting him to earn a small
return on them and still to be in a position to recall them whenever
needed. It also provided expert knowledge of the relative safety and
liquidity of the commercial bills offered in the market; the business of
the discount bankers and bill brokers was to know everything possible
about the firms whose paper they handled. The discount market thus
permitted a day-by-day-—indeed, hour-by-hour—adjustment of the
supply of short-term money to the demand for it, with a speed and
precision matched by no other money market. The discount houses
were important also as a buffer between the joint stock banks and
the Bank of England. Unlike commercial banks in most countries, the
joint stock banks in England did not go to the central bank when they
to improve their cash position; instead, they called in loans
made to the discount market and so compelled the discount houses to
go to the Bank of England for whatever rediscounting was necessary.
MERCHANT BANKS
The merchant banks, or acceptance houses, were firms originally
engaged in trade, and especially foreign trade. Most of them were
established early in the nineteenth century by continental merchants.
Their banking function consisted mainly of accepting foreign trade
bills, and thus making them discountable at the banks. In addition,
some of the larger houses made loans to foreign governments and firms.
By 1913, most of them had abandoned merchandising and had evolved
into bankers specializing in international finance; they were accepting
deposits, making loans, floating and underwriting new capital issues,
and investing in securities.'0 The majority of the houses were organized
as partnerships, with unlimited liability for each partner.
9 Balance sheet statements of discount houses are given in Appendix Table D.
10 Balance sheet statement for Baring Brothers,1913,isgiven in Appendix
Table E.
7The merchant bankers were by no means restricted to financing
British trade with the rest of the world. their acceptance
functions, they financed much of the trade between countries far from
English shores. Indeed, so common was this kind of transaction that
the pound sterling was, for all practical purposes, the international
medium of payment.
CAPITAL MARKET
As ordinarily used, the term "Lombard Street" refers only to the
institutions in the City of London providing short- and intermediate-
term credit. In fact, however, a hard and fast line cannot be drawn
between the short- and long-term money markets. The merchant banks
—surely as indigenous to Lombard Street as any institution—engaged
in long-term foreign lending before World War I. Moreover, the joint
stock banks provided long-term capital indirectly, since the facilities
they offered enabled their clients to economize in the amount of long-
term capital which they employed. Therefore, although this study is
concernedprimarily withthe marketfor funds,the
long-term capital market cannot be ignored altogether.
Certain institutions in the capital market, in 1913 as well as today,
were quite distinct from those already discussed. The most obvious
were the stock exchange and the stockbrokers. In addition, there were
syndicates formed occasionally for the flotation of a particular new
issue. Conspicuously absent from the London capital market were
large industrial banks of the Continental type, or investment banking
houses of the American type.
Actually, much of the long-term financing of British industry was pro-
vided directly by private individuals and nonfinancial concerns. A large
proportion of British industry consisted of private companies and part-
nerships. Such concerns were unable to borrow from the general public,
and relied chiefly on family savings or on the accumulation of their own
profits. If they borrowed long-term funds at all, they went directly to
the lender and not to the organized capital market. Loans from friends
and acquaintances, safeguarded only by common-law contracts, were
the chief sources of outside long-term capital for domestic enterprise.
Prior to World War I, new issues in the capital market were primarily
for overseas borrowers, with railways the largest single category of
such borrowers; domestic issues amounted to about 20 percent of the
total floated on the London market, even when issues of central and
local government authorities are included.
8LOMBARD STREET AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
The financial institutions of Lombard Street in 1913 formed a com-
plicated, delicate, but highly efficient machine, and this machine was
without rival in its scale of operations. International trade and finance
centered in London. The activities of the City were based to a large
extent on trade between countries producing manufactured goods (such
as Great Britain) and countries producing raw materials and foodstuffs
(such as countries of the British Empire). Britain's foreign lending went
a long way toward financing her own exports and developing raw
materials markets. So widely accepted was sterling as an international
means of payment that Lombard Street financed much of the trade
between non-British countries as well.
W. A. Brown has presented a convincing case for the contention that
the period of British pre-eminence in international trade and finance
coincided with the period of successful operation of the international
gold standard; and that the international gold standard was successful
chiefly because it was in fact a "sterling exchange standard system."11
This system provided an efficient distribution of credit and gold, a
common medium of payment (sterling), and an international clearing
house and foreign exchange market, all organized and operated through
London. London was the center for distributing newly mined gold, and
world markets were bound together by movements of gold and capital
through London.
Even before World War I, there were signs that this sterling exchange
standard system was beginning to break down. 'The industrial basis of
Britain's international trade position was dangerously narrow. Over half
her exports consisted of textiles and iron and steel, but the development
ofefficientindustriesfor manufacturing these products inother
countries, notably the United States, Germany, and Japan, was threat-
ening Britain's superiority in these fields. Her share in world trade was
declining, and the deterioration of Britain's terms of trade, which was
to be an important factor in Britain's international problems at a later
date, was already making its appearance. The positions of New York,
Paris, and Berlin as financial centers, while still subsidiary to London's,
were nevertheless assuming greater importance. World War I accel-
erated these basic trends, and disrupted both national and international
trade and finance in a manner that left a permanent imprint on
Lombard Street.
11 William Adams Brown, Jr., The International Cold Standard Reinterpreted,
1914-1934 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1940) Vol. I, p. xiii. The dis-
cussion in this section is based primarily on Professor Brown's study.
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